| Five years after seizing power in a bloodless coup, | | | | Pakistan, but for regional and world peace." |
| Pakistan’s military Dictator, and self-appointed | | | | No two opinions are the same about the time-tested |
| President Pervez Musharraf remains Pakistan's most | | | | notion that what appears to be convenient in the |
| powerful man. | | | | short-term is likely to be catastrophic in the long |
| Shortly after the 1999 coup, General Musharraf told | | | | term. Who knows this better than the US, which is |
| the nation: "I shall not allow the people to be taken | | | | being blamed for its past patronage of today's |
| back to the era of sham democracy." Five years | | | | rascals and past "freedom fighters"--the Muslim |
| later, the people realized that Musharraf has truly | | | | fundamentalist? A key lesson of September 11 is that |
| kept his word. He did not allow anyone to take | | | | terrorism springs from religious and political extremism |
| people back to the era of shame democracy. He did | | | | nurtured by autocracy and the suppression of |
| it himself. | | | | democratic voices. |
| The lesson General Musharraf and his Western | | | | Before September 11, Pervez Musharraf was more |
| backers are leaving behind for other coup leaders in | | | | shunned than sought after by world leaders. Today, |
| this process is: If the constitution does not legitimize | | | | the opposite is true. The General himself, when he |
| your actions, delegitimize the constitution. That you | | | | was army chief, was seen as an instigator of |
| can do by virtue of holding it in abeyance. In the | | | | dangerous Pakistani provocations in |
| meanwhile, instead of mending your ways, amend | | | | Indian-administered Kashmir in 1999, a period best |
| the constitution to legitimize both your actions and | | | | remembered as the "Kargil crisis." Later that year, he |
| the "sacred" document. | | | | seized power in a bloodless coup and named himself |
| It might sound odd and impossible but not for | | | | president in 2001, kicking out the civilian Prime Minister |
| someone backed up by absolute power. | | | | by accusing him of selling the national interest to US |
| The former shame Pakistani democracies now seem | | | | and India by agreeing to withdraw from the Kargil |
| far better by comparison when looked at in the | | | | area in Indian Kashmir--an agreement Musharraf |
| perspective of all the crusaders of democracy fully | | | | characterized as compromising national security. |
| approving and supporting a people's living under a | | | | General Musharraf is lucky as he is riding high |
| systematically legalized dictatorship. | | | | internationally, having transformed his image from a |
| The move by Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s | | | | virtual pariah to an ally of the West following his |
| military ruler, to legitimize and cement his grip on | | | | post-September 11 desertion of the Taliban. He has |
| power through a passing awkward bill, The Bill to | | | | used that American-compelled turnabout in Pakistani |
| Enable the President of Pakistan to Hold Another | | | | policy and his assistance in the anti-terror war to reap |
| Office’ in the national assembly on October | | | | major benefits, including significant Western aid and |
| 14th, 2004 to extend his self-declared Presidency is | | | | legitimizing his dictatorship. He has also kept |
| as clear a manifestation of the absurdity of the | | | | Washington happy through certain concessions, like |
| exercise to legitimize General Pervez Musharraf and | | | | giving permission to the US forces to join Pakistani |
| to remain in uniform as Chief of Army staff for | | | | troops in hunting in the Pakistani territory. In turn, |
| unspecified period is likely to see him emerge far | | | | General Musharraf has taken advantage of the |
| weaker politically and more vulnerable on the | | | | friendly attitudes of the West not only to break his |
| legitimacy question. In reneging on his pledge to | | | | democracy pledge but also to shrink back from |
| return Pakistan to democracy, General Musharraf has | | | | promises he made in when he took power. |
| attacked the main political parties and their leaders | | | | General Musharraf oils his dictatorship with American |
| and he alienated the very constituency that | | | | aid, as did the previous Pakistani dictator, General Zia |
| supported his bloodless coup. The reality is that | | | | ul-Haq, who spurred on the rise of the forces of jihad |
| without the military’s grip on power being | | | | and Islamisation campaign are still being felt today. |
| loosened and the rogue Inter-Services Intelligence | | | | The militant groups remain well-organised, well-armed |
| agency being cut to size, there can be no real, | | | | and well- financed. Yet General Musharraf continues |
| sustained movement in Pakistan toward democracy. | | | | to place limits on American anti-terrorist operations, |
| The fact that in Pakistan holding public meetings and | | | | barring American forces from making independent |
| taking part in public demonstrations and processions | | | | hot-pursuit raids from Afghanistan into Pakistan. It is |
| are offenses under military decree is overshadowed | | | | becoming more certain with every passing moment |
| by the General's rhetoric of "containing militancy". | | | | that the international community--read as 'USA'--is |
| Musharraf plans to continue his military dictatorship | | | | going to repeat the mistakes of the past--the |
| through a manufactured political party PML-Q | | | | mistake of supporting and nurturing Suhartos, |
| (Pakistan Muslim League-Q), shutting out from the | | | | Pinochets, Marcos and Zias. |
| contest the legitimate political parties and leaders of | | | | The perpetrators of "Operation Enduring Freedom" |
| Pakistan. Two of Pakistan's ex-prime ministers are | | | | are collaborating with Pakistan's generals to snatch |
| living in exile, and plenty of political workers are | | | | the very freedom from the people of Pakistan that |
| disqualified from taking part in the Pakistani politics. | | | | they claim to be fighting for. |
| Political parties fear that the secrete dealing between | | | | The country’s fifty-five year history has been |
| General Musharraf and a coalition of Islamist political | | | | a series of lengthy duels between general and |
| parties would play into the long-term goals of | | | | politician, with civil servants acting as seconds for |
| Pakistani Islamic fundamentalism (The dictator, and | | | | both sides. Statistics reveal the winner: while elected |
| the coalition of Islamist hardliners, the MMA (MULLAH | | | | representatives have run the country for fifteen |
| MILITARY ALLIANCE) has already a deal and MMA | | | | years, and unaccountable bureaucrats and their tame |
| has supported a bill in parliament by which the | | | | front men for eleven, the Army has been in power |
| president can dismiss the prime minister - the move | | | | for Thirty Fiveleading some to suggest that the |
| would have to be ratified by the Supreme court). To | | | | green-and-white national flag might be re-coloured |
| them, failure to return to democracy means that | | | | khaki. It is a dismal record, but the Pakistan high |
| extremist allies remaining within Pakistan's security | | | | command has never tolerated interference from |
| services cannot be effectively rooted out. | | | | civilian politicians for too long. The last elected leader |
| "Civilian control of all aspects of national policy, | | | | to believe he had the Army firmly under his control, |
| including security matters, is the only way to ensure | | | | Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had to be disabused of the notion. |
| that Pakistan does not become a haven for | | | | In 1977, on the orders of General Ziaan erstwhile |
| extremists again," one political analyst remarked. | | | | favourite whom Bhutto had promoted over the |
| "Let us remember the lessons of Iran," writes Benazir | | | | heads of five, more deserving, superior |
| Bhutto. "The Shah of Iran was the West's surrogate | | | | officersthe prime minister was removed from |
| regional policeman for decades. His policies of choking | | | | power and hanged two years later. |
| and victimizing democratic forces led to the | | | | No dictator believes in a short tenure. If Musharraf |
| fundamentalist revolution from which the world has | | | | had any plans of turning over power to a civilian, he |
| yet to recover." | | | | wouldn't have given the Sharif family its one-way |
| She continues, "For the moment, some might find | | | | ticket to Riyadh |
| Musharraf's dictatorship useful. But the United States | | | | Of the four dictators Pakistan has had, two have |
| must proceed with great caution and wisdom. In the | | | | been assassinated; another two were removed in |
| words of John F. Kennedy, 'Foreign policy requires | | | | disgrace. There should be no reason for Musharraf to |
| the long view.' Ultimately, the West's blind eye to | | | | believe he would buck the trend |
| democracy and human rights can have unintended, | | | | Author is currently living in EXILE in Sweden. |
| unforeseen, and deadly consequences, not just in | | | | |